VYNN researchNasdaq: AAPLRun of 3 Oct 2026
Apple
fair value
On 3 Oct 2026, VYNN’s model valued Apple at $224.55 a share, 32.7% below the $333.69 price. A Strong Sell, published with low confidence.
Confidence alert, from the reportLow confidence: VYNN's fair value is 33% below the market price, while the mean target of 39 analysts is 2% below it, which backs less than half of that move. That is a large gap between VYNN and the Street, so treat this as VYNN's own view and weigh both.
A dated research record. It does not update, and it is not investment advice.
- Price at the run
- $333.69
- VYNN fair value, 32.7% below the price
- $224.55
- Analysts' mean target, 39 analysts
- $328.09
- Rating, low confidence
- Strong Sell
Price, model and analysts on one scale.
The two methods give $204.72 and $244.38. Their midpoint is the fair value. The price at the run sits above both.
52-week range$243.42 to $345.34
VYNN’s two methods$204.72 to $244.38
39 analysts’ targets$215.00 to $405.00
In VYNN’s rules a Strong Sell is a fair value 30% or more below the price; Apple’s is 32.7% below. Confidence is low for two reasons: both methods rest on one cash-flow forecast, with no independent peer-multiple method in this run, and the 39 analysts’ mean target, 1.7% below the price, backs less than half of VYNN’s gap.
What $333.69 asks of Apple.
A price is a forecast. This is the growth the market was paying for at the run.
At this price, revenue would have to grow about 14% a year for 10 years at the modeled margins; on the same measure, the model's analyst-based forecasts come to about 8% a year.
Read the other way: to justify the price, the business needs terminal free cash flow of $508.85B. The model has $241.64B, so the market is asking for 110.6% more than the model expects.
Two methods, one forecast.
Both discount the same ten years of free cash flow. They differ in how they value what comes after.
Perpetual growth
$204.72 a share
After year ten, cash flow grows 2.5% a year for good.
- Present value of free cash flows
- $1,223.62B
- Terminal value
- $1,701.99B
- Enterprise value
- $2,925.61B
- Equity value
- $2,987.78B
Exit multiple
$244.38 a share
In year ten, the business is valued at 29.1 times EBITDA.
- Exit multiple (EV/EBITDA)
- 29.1x
- Terminal enterprise value
- $5,241.59B
- Enterprise value
- $3,504.31B
- Equity value
- $3,566.48B
Fair value, the midpoint of the two$224.55
The cost of capital, built from published data
- Risk-free rate
- 5.04%
- US 10-year Treasury 5.28% (Yahoo, 2 Oct 2026), less the 0.23% US sovereign default spread (Moody's Aa1, Damodaran, Jan 2026)
- Equity risk premium
- 3.47%
- Mature-market premium 3.24%, implied by 74 S&P 500 prices, plus the 0.23% US country premium (Damodaran, Jan 2026)
- Levered beta
- 1.07
- 1.10 against the S&P 500 over 59 monthly returns, Dec 2021 to Oct 2026, Blume-adjusted
- Cost of equity
- 8.75%
- = risk-free + beta × premium
- Pre-tax cost of debt
- 5.68%
- Risk-free, plus the 0.23% sovereign spread, plus 0.40% for a synthetic AAA rating at 34.91x interest cover (Damodaran's rating table)
- Tax rate
- 16.44%
- Normalized cash tax rate, the same one used in the cash flows
- Equity weight
- 98.30%
- Market capitalisation over market capitalisation plus debt
- WACC
- 8.68%
- = equity cost × equity weight + after-tax debt cost × debt weight
What would change the answer.
The two assumptions a valuation leans on most, moved one step at a time.
| Cost of capital | Terminal growth | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% | |
| 7.68% | $219 | $231 | $245 | $262 | $283 |
| 8.18% | $202 | $212 | $223 | $237 | $253 |
| 8.68% | $187 | $195 | $205 | $216 | $229 |
| 9.18% | $175 | $182 | $189 | $198 | $208 |
| 9.68% | $164 | $169 | $176 | $183 | $192 |
The outlined cell is the model’s own case. Shaded cells are above the $333.69 price: 0 of the 25.
What the price and the analysts imply
| To arrive at | Cost of capital | or terminal growth |
|---|---|---|
| The model | 8.68% | 2.50% |
| The price, $333.69 | 6.32% | 5.65% |
| The analysts' mean target, $328.09 | 6.31% | 5.66% |
Each figure solves one assumption while the model’s cash flows and the other assumption stay fixed. A diagnostic, not a valuation.
The forecast behind it.
Four reported years, then the first five of the ten the model projects.
| Year | Revenue | Growth | Free cash flow |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | $394.33B | $111.44B | |
| FY2023 | $383.29B | −2.8% | $99.58B |
| FY2024 | $391.04B | 2.0% | $108.81B |
| FY2025 | $416.16B | 6.4% | $98.77B |
| Year 1Forecast | $515.35B | 10.4% | $145.87B |
| Year 2 | $565.47B | 9.7% | $156.62B |
| Year 3 | $614.82B | 8.7% | $169.23B |
| Year 4 | $662.35B | 7.7% | $181.14B |
| Year 5 | $706.95B | 6.7% | $192.04B |
The reported years end 30 September. Forecast years run from 30 Jun 2026, so Year 1 grows from revenue over the twelve months to that date, $466.82B in the workbook, not from FY2025. The first forecast year matches analysts' revenue estimates (40 analysts) by design, which the report says is not independent validation.
What the news adds.
VYNN read 12 dated articles from the 90 days before the run, the newest from 12 Sep 2026, and classed the tone as bearish. The price target is the model’s fair value; the news is the evidence beside it.
Catalysts
Recent reported results show strong revenue and Services performance, providing a substantial operating base during the CEO transition.
The iPhone Duo launch could create incremental premium-device revenue and give Apple a meaningful share of the foldable-phone segment.
Apple's first foldable iPhone could lift average selling prices and stimulate an iPhone upgrade cycle.
Risks
Memory-cost inflation and tight chip supply could constrain product availability and pressure gross margins and growth.
The foldable-phone opportunity may be too small to materially affect Apple's overall growth, and long-term consumer adoption is uncertain.
Apple's premium valuation and consumer price sensitivity leave the stock exposed to disappointment if growth slows or higher prices are not accepted.
Apple faces an established foldable competitor in Samsung and may struggle to differentiate the iPhone Duo's target customer and use case.
Apple's AI offering and product innovation remain unproven, creating a risk of weaker differentiation and missed growth opportunities.
Each item is VYNN’s summary of dated articles, with the sources and quotations listed in the report’s appendix.
What VYNN checked before it published.
Published, with the gap to the Street stated
The workbook's status reads Publishable, low confidence: far from analyst consensus. VYNN publishes its own value and states the gap in one sentence, quoted under the headline of this page.
Confidence is stated as low, and why
The two methods share one cash-flow forecast, one discount rate and the same terminal economics, and no independent peer-multiple method was available. The report calls the result a scenario range, not an independently triangulated value.
Analysts' targets stay outside the value
Price targets and ratings are shown as a benchmark and are never averaged into the fair value. Analysts' revenue estimates do anchor the first forecast year (40 analysts), and the report says so.
Prose that could not be supported was left out
Four claims in the written recommendation did not pass the claim-to-evidence check after rewrite attempts. The report omits that prose and prints the source headlines instead.
The files from this run.
Check any step, or change an assumption yourself.
- The research reportPDF, 38 pages
- The financial modelExcel, 10 tabs with live formulas
- Engine valuation-2026-09-27.1. Generated 3 Oct 2026, 00:48 UTC.